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Abstract
The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than
involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple
dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents
variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences,
which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These
variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse
than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That is
impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments.
According to
The Transitivity of Better Than: For any bearers of value A, B, and C, if
A is better than B, all things considered, and B is better than C, all things
considered, then A is better than C, all things considered.1
This paper is about some purported counterexamples to transitivity developed by
Rachels (1993; 1998; 2001) and Temkin (1987; 1996; 2012). Following Temkin, I
call them spectrum arguments.
The spectrum arguments against transitivity present a sequence of outcomes,
lives, or experiences, which vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and
intensity of pleasure or pain. Here is an example due to Rachels, which I call
The Bad Spectrum:
A: 1 year of excruciating agony.
B: 2 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in A.
C: 4 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in B.
D: 8 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in C.
. . .
Y: 224 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in X.
Z: 225 years of pain slightly less intense than the mild pain in Y.
The excruciating agony in A, for example, might be the worst kind of torture you
can imagine. The mild pain in Zmight be the discomfort of a hangnail or a waning
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mosquito bite. Following Temkin (2012, 284), I assume that the experiences in each
spectrum are endured in lives of equal length, and that each life is similar to its
successor, except with respect to the experiences described. We might imagine that,
aside from these painful experiences, the life is otherwise neutral—e.g., because
the rest of it is spent unconscious, or in ways that are neither better nor worse
than unconsciousness (as imagined by Rachels 1998, 78). To many people, A seems
better than B, which seems better than C, which seems better than D, . . . , which
seems better than Y, which seems better than Z, but Z seems better than A. If each
comparison is at it seems, then better than is not transitive.
Consider next
The Good Spectrum:
A: 1 year of extraordinary ecstasy.
B: 2 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in A.
C: 4 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in B.
D: 8 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in C.
. . .
Y: 224 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in X.
Z: 225 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the mild pleasure in Y.
In this case, Z seems better than Y, . . . , which seems better than B, which seems
better than A, but (to many people) A seems better than Z. If each comparison is
as it seems, then better than is not transitive.
I call anyone who accepts these comparisons a cyclist. Cyclists believe that there
are, or could be, betterness cycles—i.e., sequences of items x1, . . . , xn in which
each xi is better than xi+1, and yet xn is better than x1. One could, in principle,
reject transitivity without being a cyclist.2 But the most powerful arguments against
transitivity involve apparent betterness cycles, as in the spectrum arguments above.
These two examples—the good spectrum and the bad spectrum—will serve as ad-
equate samples of the Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments. Temkin (2012) presents
a wide variety of other spectrum arguments, but the ones above will allow us to
bring out the relevant issues in the simplest form. What all of these arguments have
in common is (among other things) that, within each spectrum, the items are either
all good or all bad, all things considered. The experiences in the bad spectrum,
for example, are bad; those in the good spectrum are good. What do I mean by
“good” and “bad”? For now, I’m taking some ordinary sense of these words for
granted. Plausibly, a year of extraordinary ecstasy is good if anything is, and a year
of horrible agony is bad if anything is.3
We might hope that this common feature of the Rachels–Temkin spectrum ar-
guments would mitigate the deliberative crisis posed by a rejection of transitivity.
If transitivity fails, then it may seem impossible for the better than relation to
guide our choices or attitudes in many cases. This is because, for any outcome
we choose or prefer, there may be some better alternative that we ought to have
chosen or preferred instead. The rejection of transitivity might, therefore, lead to
skepticism about practical reasoning, or at least about the role of the good in prac-
tical reasoning.4 But this deliberative crisis might not be too severe if there is some
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partition of outcomes into those that are good, those that are bad, and those that
are neither good nor bad. For we would at least know not to choose or prefer
outcomes that are bad rather than alternatives that are good. For example, it would
be wrong to bring about one of the outcomes in the bad spectrum when we could
instead bring about one of the outcomes in the good spectrum. That would be nice.
But we can combine good and bad experiences to form a new, and no less
compelling, kind of spectrum argument. This new kind of spectrum argument will
show that the reasoning behind the Rachels–Temkin arguments has consequences
that are even more radical than the violation of transitivity.
I present my modified spectrum arguments in section 1. I then argue, in sections
2 and 3, that even those who might be willing to reject the transitivity of better
than should not embrace the more radical implications of my variations. We should,
therefore, reject the spectrum arguments against transitivity. I conclude, in section 4,
by considering how these arguments might be rejected. I tentatively suggest that
the arguments are instances of the sorites paradox.
1. Combined Spectrum Arguments
We begin with an outcome A that contains a single year of excruciating agony and
also contains some amount of ecstasy. How much ecstasy, you ask? Enough so
that A is neutral—neither good nor bad overall. For some, that might just be a
single year. For others, it takes much more pleasure to counterbalance pain. I will
suppose that it takes three years of extraordinary ecstasy to counterbalance the year
of agony.5 (Readers who think that no amount of ecstasy could counterbalance a
year of agony—i.e., that any life with one year of agony is bad, no matter how
much ecstasy it contains—might instead imagine some shorter duration of agony,
which could be counterbalanced by three years of ecstasy. Some of my arguments
would, I think, succeed even for such shorter durations. And some of my arguments
might succeed even if no duration of ecstasy could counterbalance any duration of
agony.)
Think of it this way. Suppose that we could choose whether or not to bring
someone into existence with a certain kind of life. If this life would be miserable
overall, it would be wrong to bring her into existence, other things being equal.
That would be true, for example, if her life contained a year of excruciating agony
and many years of neutrality. But surely (I think) there is some number of years of
extraordinary ecstasy such that, if her life contained such years in addition to the
year of agony (and many years of neutrality), it would not be wrong to bring her
into existence.6 I am supposing that three is one such number. Readers who deny
that three is such a number, or that there is any such number, are invited to imagine
longer durations of ecstasy, or shorter durations of agony, instead.
Now consider
The Bad Spectrum with Ecstasy:
A: 1 year of excruciating agony and 3 years of ecstasy.
B: 2 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in A and 3 years of
ecstasy.
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C: 4 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in B and 3 years of
ecstasy.
D: 8 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in C and 3 years of
ecstasy.
. . .
Y: 224 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in X and 3 years of
ecstasy.
Z: 225 years of pain slightly less intense than the mild pain in Y and 3 years
of ecstasy.
As we descend down the alphabet, the outcomes seem to get worse and worse. And
yet A seems worse than Z. These judgments together violate transitivity.
But consider the following. A is neither good nor bad, all things considered. (If
you disagree, then adjust the duration of pleasure or pain as needed.) However,
some of A’s successors along the spectrum are surely bad overall—D, for instance.
(If you disagree, then move further down the alphabet.) Now consider
The Badness Principle:
For any value bearers x and y, if x is bad and y is worse than x, then y is
also bad.
If D is bad, and if F is worse than D, then F must also be bad. D is indeed bad.
And F certainly seems worse than D. So F must also be bad. Since each outcome
seems worse than its predecessor—i.e., than the outcome labeled by its immediate
predecessor in the alphabet—iterations of this reasoning tell us that Z is bad, too.
But A, which is not bad, seems worse than Z. This violates the badness principle.
(Note that this argument does not assume transitivity.)
We have just seen that, given the badness principle, the following claims are
inconsistent:
(1) In the bad spectrum with ecstasy, each outcome is worse than its predecessor.
(2) In the bad spectrum with ecstasy, A is worse than Z.
(3) Some of the outcomes in the bad spectrum with ecstasy are bad.
(4) Not all of the outcomes in the bad spectrum with ecstasy are bad.
Claims (1) and (2) generate the argument against transitivity. If we add claims (3)
and (4), then we get a violation of the badness principle. More generally, if we have
a betterness cycle, then the badness principle requires that either all or none of the
outcomes in the cycle be bad.7 One bad apple really can ruin the barrel!
Which claim should we reject? I am inclined to see this as a reductio of the
conjunction of (1) and (2)—i.e., the crucial judgments in the Rachels–Temkin argu-
ments against transitivity.8 I am not certain which of these two claims I would reject
(although I make some speculative remarks in section 4). But these two claims seem
to me collectively less plausible than (3), (4), and the badness principle.
Consider (3). Surely, if anything is bad, then at least one of the outcomes in the
bad spectrum with ecstasy is bad. To show this, consider a month of moderate pain.
If anything is bad, that’s bad. It would be wrong to bring someone into existence
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if her life would contain that experience alone. But, I submit, at least one of the
outcomes in the bad spectrum with ecstasy is worse than that, all things considered.
Sure, they each involve three years of extraordinary ecstasy. But they also involve
vastly greater durations and intensities of pain than our month of moderate pain.
So, if anything is bad, then at least one of the outcomes in the bad spectrum with
ecstasy is bad.
That conditional is not enough to secure (3). For maybe nothing whatsoever is
bad. I consider that possibility in section 3. For now, it suffices to note that rejecting
(3) would be a radical move.
Next consider (4). Some might claim that all of the outcomes in the bad spectrum
with ecstasy are bad. But we designed A to be neutral. Even if three years of ecstasy
is not enough, then surely there is some greater duration of pleasure that would be
enough to prevent A from being bad overall.9 Some might follow Gurney (1887) in
holding that no amount of pleasure can compensate for sufficiently intense agony.
But then consider Z, which contains only mild discomfort. Surely some quantity of
pleasure would be enough to make Z good, all things considered.10 And yet, if we
followed Gurney, that quantity would not make all of the outcomes good, so we
would continue to accept (3).
That leaves the badness principle. I discuss it in section 2, after expanding my
argument.
We can now consider another spectrum of this kind:
The Good Spectrum with Agony:
A: 3 years of ecstasy and 1 year of agony.
B: 6 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in A, and 1 year of
agony.
C: 12 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in B, and 1 year
of agony.
D: 24 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in C, and 1 year
of agony.
. . .
Y: 3 × 224 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the pleasure in X, and
1 year of agony.
Z: 3 × 225 years of pleasure slightly less intense than the mild pleasure in Y,
and 1 year of agony.
Each outcome seems better than its predecessor, and yet A seems better than Z.
This violates transitivity. But it is also plausible that at least one outcome in this
spectrum is good, all things considered. D seems good overall, for example. (Readers
who disagree might imagine that each life in this spectrum contains some shorter
period of agony.) But if D is good overall, and if each outcome is better than its
predecessor, then E must also be good overall, by
The Goodness Principle:
For any value bearers x and y, if x is good and y is better than x, then y is also
good.
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So Z must be good all things considered. But then A, which seems better than
Z, must be good. However, we have designed A so that it is neutral. And Z, in
any case, does not seem good. This illustrates a similar inconsistency, given the
goodness principle:
(5) In the good spectrum with agony, each outcome is better than its predecessor.
(6) In the good spectrum with agony, A is better than Z.
(7) Some of the outcomes in the good spectrum with agony are good.
(8) Not all of the outcomes in the good spectrum with agony are good.
As before, claims (5) and (6) ground the challenge to transitivity. If we add (7) and
(8), then we violate the goodness principle. If we reject (5) or (6), then we can reject
the Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against transitivity.
We can now turn to a third set of outcomes, which I consider to be the most
compelling variation on the spectrum arguments:
The Combined Spectrum:
A: 3 × 225 years of mild pleasure, and 1 year of agony.
B: 3 × 224 years of pleasure slightly more intense than the pleasure in A, and
2 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in A.
. . .
Y: 6 years of pleasure slightly more intense than the pleasure in X,
and 224 years of pain slightly less intense than the pain in X.
Z: 3 years of ecstasy even more intense than the pleasure in Y, and 225 years of
pain even less intense than in the pain in Y.
In the combined spectrum, each outcome seems much worse than its predecessor,
and yet A seems worse than Z. But some of the outcomes (e.g., A) seem bad, all
things considered, and others (e.g., Z) seem good. Given the goodness and badness
principles, these claims are inconsistent:
(9) In the combined spectrum, each outcome is worse than its predecessor.
(10) In the combined spectrum, Z is better than A.
(11) Some of the outcomes in the combined spectrum are either good or bad.
(12) Not all of the outcomes in the combined spectrum are good, and not all of
them are bad.
Note that (11) is weaker than the corresponding claims about the good spectrum
with agony and the bad spectrum with ecstasy. (11) is satisfied just in case at least
one of the outcomes in the combined spectrum is either good or bad. Suppose that
we rejected this premise. Then, I think, we should conclude that nothing is good
or bad.11 For if some outcomes were good or bad, then we would expect them to
be better or worse than some outcomes that could be situated in some purported
betterness cycle. For example, five hundred years of excruciating agony would be
bad if anything is. But it would also be worse than than fifty years of slightly
more excruciating agony, along with some massive duration of mild pleasure. And
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the latter outcome could be situated in some purported betterness cycle like the
combined spectrum above.
Claim (12) is stronger than its analogues regarding the good spectrum with
agony and the bad spectrum with ecstasy. But it is still eminently plausible. If we
think, with the cyclists, that a sufficient duration of extraordinary ecstasy would be
better than any duration of mild pleasure, and that a sufficient duration of horrible
agony would be worse than any duration of mild pain, then we should judge A to
be bad and Z to be good—at least, given suitable durations for our pleasures and
pains. After all, on this way of thinking, A would be worse than a few minutes of
mild pain, which would be bad, and Z would be better than a few minutes of mild
pleasure, which would be good. (12) would then follow by the goodness and badness
principles. If, on the other hand, we think that for any duration of ecstasy, there
is some duration of mild pleasure that would be better, and that for any duration
of agony, there is some duration of mild pain that would be worse, then we should
still accept (12): we would judge A to be good and Z to be bad, given suitable
durations of mild pleasure and pain. Therefore, we should accept (12) regardless
of whether we share the cyclists’ judgments about long durations of mild pleasure
and pain.
That leaves two options for the cyclists. The first option is to reject the goodness
and badness principles. I consider this option in section 2. The second option,
which I consider in section 3, is to deny that anything is good or bad. I argue that
neither option is plausible.
2. The Goodness and Badness Principles
The goodness and badness principles seem to me obvious. I do not have a decisive
argument for them. But, in this section, I mention several considerations that
support these principles.
2.1. Monotonicity
Many people would accept the goodness and badness principles as instances of a
more general principle:
Monotonicity:
For any gradable adjective F , if x is F and y is Fer than x, then y is F .
Note that the positive form F must be understood relative to the same context or
comparison class in both the antecedent and the consequent. For example, if Sally
is tall for a kindergartener and Muggsy Bogues is taller than Sally, it does not follow
that Muggsy Bogues is tall for an NBA player. But if someone counts as tall in
some context, relative to some fixed comparison class, then anyone taller than that
person would also count as tall in that context, relative to that same comparison
class. I return to this kind of issue in section 3. But, for now, let us bracket it.
Monotonicity is widely accepted by linguists and philosophers.12 One reason for
this is that monotonicity follows from the most natural views about the semantics
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of the positive and comparative forms of gradable adjectives. There are two kinds
of such views: the first kind takes the comparative form as basic; the second kind
takes the positive form as basic.
Proponents of the first kind of view tend to think of gradable adjectives as rela-
tions between individuals and degrees (Kennedy 2004). For example, the adjective
tall expresses a relation between an object x and a degree of height d such that
the object’s height is at least as great as d. For the adjective’s positive form, the
relevant degree argument is some contextually relevant standard. For example, one
counts as tall in some context if and only if there is a degree d to which one is
tall such that d is at least as great as the contextually relevant standard (Barker
2002, 7).
Monotonicity can then be obtained in either of two ways. The first is by assuming
the transitivity of the at least as great as relation over the set of degrees. By
transitivity, if y is taller than x and x is at least as tall as the relevant standard
of comparison, then y is at least as tall as that standard; therefore, y too counts
as tall. It would, of course, beg the question to appeal directly to transitivity in
the present context. But monotonicity can also be obtained in a second way. It is
generally assumed that if x is F to degree d, then x is also F to any degree d′ where
d ≥ d ′.13 This entails mononotonicity. For if I am taller than you, then I am tall to
any degree that you are. So if there is a degree to which you are tall which exceeds
the contextually relevant standard, then I am tall to that degree too.
I have just explained why monotonicity follows from the first kind of view about
gradable adjectives, on which the positive form is derived from the comparative
form. Monotonicity also follows from the second kind of view, on which the com-
parative form is derived from the positive form. On this kind of view, Muggsy is
taller than Sally just in case there is some comparison class relative to whichMuggsy
counts as tall and Sally does not (Klein 1980). Suppose, for reductio, that Sally is
tall (in some context), that Muggsy is taller than Sally, but that Muggsy is not tall
(in that context). Then there is some comparison class (namely, the one relevant
to our present context) relative to which Sally counts as tall but Muggsy does
not. But, by our definition of taller than, Sally would then count as taller than
Muggsy. We have both that Sally is taller than Muggsy and that Muggsy is taller
than Sally. This violates the asymmetry of taller than. Therefore, monotonicity must
be true.
It might seem unimportant that monotonicity follows from these influential
semantic views. For what do the workings of our language have to do with which
outcomes are better or worse? The semantic facts seem to me important because the
spectrum arguments purport to show that the relation expressed by the phrase better
than is not transitive. Whether or not this is true depends, at least in part, on the
meaning of that expression, which is just one of many relevantly similar expressions
in our language. Of course, cyclists might reject the semantic views to which I
have appealed (as Temkin seems to do—I discuss his argument in section 2.2).
But then they owe us an alternative picture of the semantics of better than. For
their arguments use this expression, and we should not be convinced by these
arguments if we do not know what their premises mean.
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Cyclists might claim not to care which expression we use in their arguments.
In response to the charge that transitivity is a logical truth about comparatives
(Broome 2004), Temkin claims that although there is a sense of better than which
is transitive as a matter of logic or of language, there is also a sense which refers
to an important normative relation that need not be transitive (Temkin 2012, 13).
And it may not matter to the cyclists which words we use to express that relation.
In section 2.3, I argue that Temkin’s own account of this important normative
relation entails the goodness and badness principles. But, before that, I consider an
argument that Temkin presents against the more general principle of monotonicity.
2.2. Temkin on the Monotonicity of Hairy
Temkin (2012, 288–290) grants that some adjectives (e.g., tall) are monotonic—i.e.,
that if x is tall and y is taller than x, then y is also tall. But he seems to deny the
monotonicity of hairy. I shall summarize Temkin’s argument and then explain why I
find it unconvincing. I shall then, in section 2.3, argue that even if monotonicity fails
for some gradable adjectives, we have independent reason to accept the goodness
and badness principles.
Temkin seems to reject the monotonicity of hairy based on a spectrum argument
from hairiness to baldness (originally due to Wasserman 2005). Beginning with a
head covered evenly by a large number of hairs, and which therefore seems hairy, he
imagines making the distribution slightly less even while adding significantly more
hairs. This change would seem to make the head hairier. But a sequence of many
such changes would seem to lead to a head with a pronounced bald spot of (say)
six inches in diameter, which Temkin imagines would make the head bald, however
many hairs it contains. So we seem to have a sequence of heads h1, . . . , hn such that
each head is hairier than its predecessor, and in which h1 is hairy and hn seems not
only less hairy than h1 (in violation of the transitivity of hairier than), but also bald.
Iterations of the monotonicity of hairy, however, yield that hn must be hairy, which
seems impossible if hn is bald. Temkin seems to suggest that we should, therefore,
reject the monotonicity of hairy.
Temkin motivates this move as follows:
The key to recognizing this possibility is to recognize that while our criteria for
being “hairy” and our criteria for being “hairier than” are intimately related
to each other, we actually have different criteria for the two notions. So, while
we might be willing to countenance the possibility that even a tiny difference in
the pattern of hair distribution can make all the difference in terms of whether
someone counts as hairy or not, we don’t believe that such a tiny difference
alone can settle the question of whether one head is hairier than another. (2012,
289, emphasis his)
The violation of monotonicity is possible, Temkin suggests, only because hairiness
depends on multiple dimensions of variation—i.e., both distribution and number.
The multidimensionality of hairy distinguishes it from (say) tall, which Temkin
agrees is monotonic. Because good and bad are plausibly multidimensional—the
goodness of pleasure and badness of pain, for example, depend on both intensity
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and duration—Temkin’s view might predict that good and bad will fail to be mono-
tonic as well.
I find Temkin’s argument unconvincing. For I see no reason why the criteria for
hairy should differ so wildly from the criteria for hairier than. Temkin’s reasoning
seems to be that certain properties—e.g., having a bald spot of some size—make
it the case that one’s head is not hairy, no matter what other hairiness-relevant
properties one has, but that one’s head could have such properties while being
hairier than a head that lacks them, because other factors—e.g., quantity of hair
overall—are relevant to the comparative hairier than. I find this very hard to believe.
Those other factors should also be relevant to whether or not one’s head is hairy.
It is incredible that there should be a sharp threshold between heads that are
hairy and heads that are not hairy. There are, however, powerful arguments for that
view (Williamson 1994). But it seems to me absurd to think that (i) making one’s
pattern of hair distribution less even to some (perhaps barely noticable) degree
makes it the case that one is no longer hairy, no matter how much more hair one
has as a result, even though (ii) despite that difference, one would nonetheless be
hairier if the number of increased hairs were sufficiently large. And that is how
Temkin seems to be thinking of the hairy head that is less hairy than the not-hairy
head. We could, of course, have stipulative uses of hairy that allowed for such cases:
e.g., if we count as hairy, for some practical purpose, anyone who has at least n
hairs and has no bald spot with a radius exceeding r . But then we would not be
using the sense of hairy whose comparative form is our ordinary, multidimensional
hairier than—much like the mathematical sense of odd is not the positive form of
our ordinary, multidimensional odder than.
I am, therefore, unconvinced by Temkin’s argument for why monotonicity might
fail for hairy. But even if some gradable adjectives are not monotonic, as Temkin
claims of hairy, there is nonetheless strong reason to accept the goodness and
badness principles.
2.3. Reasons, Desires, and Preferences
Following Parfit (2011), when we call something
good, in . . . the reason-implying sense, we mean roughly that there are certain
kinds of fact about this thing’s nature, or properties, that would in certain
situations give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some
positive way, such as wanting, choosing, using, producing, or preserving this
thing. (38)
Parfit understands better than similarly. On Parfit’s view, an outcome is (all things
considered) better than some alternative in the reason-implying sense just in case
we have stronger reasons to want this outcome to obtain, or to hope that it will
obtain, than we have regarding its alternative (41).
I do not insist that we analyze or reduce goodness and badness to reasons to want
or to prefer. But it seems to me that there is a true biconditional in the vicinity:
that an outcome x is good if and only if there is strong reason, or one ought
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(Ewing 1939), or it is fitting (Broad 1933) to desire x, and that something similar
holds for betterness.
The reason-implying nature of goodness, badness, and betterness suggests an
argument for the goodness and badness principles. Suppose that some outcome x,
which we can bring about, is good. We have strong reasons to want x to obtain.
Suppose too that some alternative y is better than x. Then our reasons to want y to
obtain are even stronger than our reasons to want x to obtain. But if the goodness
principle is false, then y might not be good. So we might not have strong reasons
to want y to obtain. But that seems impossible, if we have strong reasons to want
x to obtain and even stronger reasons to want y to obtain.14
Cyclists might reject this argument for the goodness and badness principles. They
might argue that I have simply assumed monotonicity for the strength of reasons.
Why else should we expect that if we have strong reasons to want x to obtain and
even stronger reasons to want y to obtain, then we have strong reasons to want y
to obtain? They might also reject Parfit’s specification of the reason-implying sense
of better than. So let us instead consider what Temkin claims to be the relevant
sense of better than. Temkin (2012, 9) suggests that y is better than x just in case
one would have most reason to prefer y to x. And, we can assume, if one has most
reason to φ, then one ought to φ (Parfit 2011, 33).
Temkin’s reason-implying sense of better than still supports the goodness princi-
ple. If Temkin’s suggestion is correct, and if we reject the goodness principle, then it
may be true that we ought to want x to obtain and that we ought to prefer y to x,
and yet false that we ought to want y to obtain. But that combination of attitudes
seems to me not just irrational, but impossible. I can see how someone might have
nontransitive preferences; there is decent empirical evidence that we often do have
such preferences. But I cannot see how any agent—let alone a rational one—could
desire x, prefer y to x, and yet not desire y. That would be like desiring x, not
desiring ¬x, and yet preferring ¬x to x.15 That isn’t just a combination that one
ought not to have, but probably a combination that one cannot have.16
Why might this combination of attitudes be impossible? Intuitively, it’s because
our desires and preferences are not entirely independent. One set of these attitudes
seems to supervene on the other. Many decision theorists, for example, assume that
degrees of desire are derived from a set of preferences satisfying certain constraints.
Alternatively, some philosophers (e.g., Pollock 2006) take a monadic, desire-like
state as primitive, and understand preferences in terms of cardinally measurable
desires. On views of either kind, our preferences and desires don’t float freely of
each other. Our conative lives would be beyond understanding if they did.
2.4. Summary
I have not given a decisive argument for the goodness and badness principles.
But I have pointed to several considerations that support these principles. First, I
observed that they are instances of a more general principle entailed by the two
most influential views about the semantics of the positive and comparative forms
of gradable adjectives. Second, I briefly considered Temkin’s argument for why
multidimensional predicates can violate monotonicity, and have found it wanting.
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Temkin’s view would require an implausibly sharp borderline for the positive form
while maintaining tradeoffs betwen dimensions for the comparative form. That
seems to me an unstable combination of views. And third, I claimed that vi-
olations of the goodness and badness principles would require agents to have
seemingly impossible—and certainly irrational—combinations of attitudes, given
reason-implying conceptions of the relevant notions. I acknowledge that none of
these considerations is, on its own, decisive. But together, and given the independent
plausibility of the goodness and badness principles, these considerations seem to
me to militate strongly against rejecting the principles.
Let me mention one final point: rejecting the goodness and badness principles
might not be enough to avoid the implausible implications raised in section 1.
Although I have framed the discussion in terms of the goodness and badness
principles, as well as the more general principle of monotonicity, we can also ask of
each outcome along each spectrum whether it is good (or bad) if its predecessor is.
Given our more general principles, this conditional claim is entailed by the cyclists’
comparative judgment that each outcome is better (or worse) than its predecessor.
But the conditional claim would generate a problem even without our general
principles: in the combined spectrum at the end of section 1, for example, it implies
that if A is good then so is Z. (I discuss this further in section 4.) And, even without
these general principles, the conditional claim seems no less independently plausible
than the cyclists’ comparative judgment. The kinds of considerations that support
their comparative judgment would also seem to support the conditional claim that
each outcome is good (or bad) if its predecessor is. So if the cyclists wish to escape
the problems of section 1 by rejecting the goodness and badness principles, they
would still have to explain why, although they deny that each outcome is good
(or bad) if its predecessor is, they are convinced that each outcome is better (or
worse) than its predecessor. And although that conditional claim has unwanted
implications, I can see no principled rationale for rejecting it while accepting the
cyclists’ comparative judgment. So, ultimately, I suspect that rejecting the goodness
and badness principles is a non-starter.
3. Rejecting the Good
The remaining possibility is that, on the cyclists’ view, nothing is good or bad.
Now, this seems to me to be a reductio of their view. The cyclists’ judgments that
lead to this conclusion are far less compelling than that the outcomes in the good
spectrum are good, and that the outcomes in the bad spectrum are bad. But there
may be various ways in which this conclusion could be softened or clarified to be
less implausible.
3.1. Intrinsic Value
One way is to qualify the kind of goodness and badness to be rejected as intrinsic
goodness and badness—i.e., the goodness or badness that something has in virtue
of its intrinsic properties. This notion might seem to be challenged by the original
Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments, even before considering my variations on
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them. Temkin, for example, claims that transitivity is plausible on a certain kind
of picture about value—what he calls the internal aspects view—on which the value
of an outcome is entirely a function of “internal” (i.e., intrinsic) features of that
outcome, and which of two outcomes is better is entirely a function of the value of
each outcome (so conceived). Temkin suggests that one can (more) plausibly reject
transitivity by rejecting this kind of picture. If that is correct, then wouldn’t the
cyclists already reject that outcomes can be intrinsically good or bad? In that
case, we would learn little about their commitments from my combined spectrum
arguments.
But this reply would miss the mark, for three reasons.
First, rejecting an internal aspects view would not commit the cyclists to the
view that nothing is intrinsically good. To see this, consider the view that Temkin
proposes in opposition to the internal aspects view. According to what he calls
The Essentially Comparative View:
There is some outcome such that either (i) there is no answer to the question
of how good this outcome is, considered just by itself, or (ii) this answer has
no special significance or relevance to how good or bad this outcome is in
comparison with other outcomes.17
And this view falls far short of the claim that nothing is intrinsically good, in multi-
ple ways: (a) the essentially comparative view is a merely existential generalization;
(b) it could be true that every outcome is either good, bad, or neutral even if there
is no answer to the question of how good or bad it is; and (c) it is compatible with
the view that every outcome has some degree of intrinsic value or disvalue, but that
betterness is not entirely a function of intrinsic value (e.g., because the goodness
and badness principles fail). It would, therefore, be hasty to conclude that the
cyclists are already committed to the view that nothing is intrinsically good or bad.
Second, in stating my modified spectrum arguments, I did not appeal to the
quasi-technical notion of intrinsic value. The goodness and badness principles, for
example, state no such restriction. To see one reason why this is important, consider
the view that intrinsic value is extensionally distinct from noninstrumental value, or
the value that something has as an end, or for its own sake (Smith 1948; Korsgaard
1983; Rabinowicz and RPnnow-Rasmussen 2003). If we could devise spectrum
arguments involving bearers of extrinsic noninstrumental value—e.g., works of art
that derive some of their value from historical properties—then the kind of value
that the cyclists would reject need not be intrinsic.
Third, if rejecting the quasi-technical notion of intrinsic value, or any other
circumscribed notion of value, is supposed to make the cyclists’ view any more
plausible than the hardline view that nothing is good or bad, they need to explain
the sense in which, on their view, it can be kosher to say that things are good or
bad, and why things that are intuitively good or bad are indeed good or bad in
that kosher sense. Absent some such account, the view remains absurd, for some
things (e.g., long durations of pain, or of pleasure) are obviously good or bad in
an important sense.
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For an example of how one might provide such an account, consider what I said
in section 2.1 about the importance of context for the positive form of gradable
adjectives, like tall. Even if heights—i.e., how tall one is—are intrinsic, one cannot
be tall simpliciter, because whether one counts as tall in some context depends on
whether one is tall relative to some contextually salient comparison class—e.g., the
average height in one’s kindergarten class or in the NBA. (It is no threat to the
monotonicity of tall that a short NBA player can be taller than a tall kindergartner,
because the positive form of the adjective must be understood relative to the same
context when applying monotonicity.) But obviously there are important senses in
which some people are tall. In denying that anything is tall simpliciter, we can point
to a clear sense in which things can nonetheless be tall—namely, by being taller
than some contextually relevant standard. The question is whether the cyclists are
in a position to do anything like that. I shall argue that they are not.
3.2. McTaggart on Good
Might good be relevantly like tall? On such a picture, whether some outcome counts
as good or bad depends on some comparison class which varies with context, and
that is why nothing is intrinsically good or bad. This may seem implausible, because
it seems clear that undeserved suffering, for example, is bad in some context-
independent sense. But McTaggart (1927) suggests a way around this implication.
Let me explain McTaggart’s suggestion and then explain why he ultimately rejects
the picture under consideration.
McTaggart (p. 410) suggests that “qualities” (e.g., pleasure and pain) can be
good or bad, even if the things that possess or instantiate those qualities (e.g., lives,
outcomes, and token experiences) could not be. These claims are compatible because
“all that is meant by a quality being good or evil is that it makes any substance which
possesses it better or worse than it would have been otherwise.” And McTaggart
suggests that the goodness or badness of qualities is more important, for practical
purposes, than the goodness or badness of the things which possess those qualitites.
For what matters, for practical purposes, is that we make our lives and the world
better, rather than worse. We can know how to do that via knowledge of the qualities
that make things better or worse. We do not need to know whether our lives, or the
world, is good or bad, all things considered. It may, therefore, seem promising to
think of good and bad as relevantly like tall and short.
McTaggart, however, rejects this kind of view.18 His reason is that it seems
unable to make sense of the fact that the goodness and badness of outcomes and
lives are related, in certain ways, to the desirability of their existing or obtaining.
For example, if a life were filled only with undeserved suffering, then it would be
undesirable, and would make things worse, if someone lived it. The best explanation
for this claim would seem to appeal to the fact that the life is just plain bad.19 Just
as bad qualities (e.g., pain) make their possessors worse than they would otherwise
be, and are undesirable to possess, the existence of bad lives makes the world worse
than it would otherwise be and is therefore undesirable. But if the life of suffering
only counts as bad in some contexts and counts as good in others—e.g., a context
in which our lives are even worse than it—then it would seem difficult to explain
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why, in a context where it counts as very good, its existence would be undesirable
and would make the world worse.
One way of avoiding McTaggart’s problem would be to claim that some lives may
count as good, and others as bad, in all contexts. But if something which counts
as good (bad) in all contexts is worse (better) than some element of a combined
spectrum, then this strategy is not available to the cyclists. For then the elements
of the combined spectrum will all count as good (bad) in all contexts, given the
badness principle and the cyclists’ cyclical judgments. That would be an unwelcome
result.
Even if we are not persuaded by McTaggart’s objection, I doubt whether the
appeal to different contextual standards for good and bad can accommodate our
intuitions about goodness and badness in the spectrum arguments. Consider the
combined spectrum, which takes us from (A) 3 × 225 years of mild pleasure and
1 year of agony to (Z) 3 years of ecstasy and 225 years of mild pain. Each outcome
is supposed to be worse than its predecessor, but A seems worse than Z. We can
ask, of each outcome, whether it is good relative to some fixed contextual standard.
For example, let the standard be an outcome in which there are no sentient beings.
In this context, an outcome is good just in case it is better than that outcome,
and bad just in case it is worse. Intuitively, the spectrum contains some outcomes
that are good in that context and bad in that context. And, intuitively, if x counts
as good (bad) within some context and y is better (worse) than x, then y must
also count as good (bad) within that context. What this shows is that, given the
cyclists’ judgment that each outcome is worse than its predecessor, we are left with
inconsistent intuitions even when our judgments about good and bad are restricted
to a single context. And so the rejection of context-independent goodness and
badness, on the model of tall, does not save our intuitive judgments about the cases
under consideration.
3.3. Reference-Dependent Betterness
The cyclists, therefore, need a more radical picture than the one on which good and
bad are like tall. Consider a different analogy. According to the A-theory of time,
there is a meaningful and objective partition of times into past, present, and future.
B-theorists deny this. But there are two ways of being a B-theorist. One kind of
B-theorist thinks that although there is no privileged present, past, or future, the
relations earlier than and later than are not similarly suspect. Just like there is a
context-independent taller than ordering but no context-independent sense of tall,
this kind of B-theorist thinks that there is an objective earlier than relation but no
objective property of being in the future or the past. But other philosophers are
B-theorists for reasons having to do with special relativity. According to the special
theory of relativity, there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity; there is only
simultaneity relative to a frame of reference. This makes it hard to be an A-theorist,
because an objective present time would seem to require absolute simultaneity, or
at least some privileged frame of reference relative to which simultaneity amounts
to being present. If we think that there is no such privileged frame of reference,
our view is more radical than what we said about tall. For although whether or not
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one is tall depends on the contextually salient standard for tallness, the ordering
imposed by the relation taller than does not depend on context. By contrast, which
of two events precedes the other, and not just whether or not some event is in the
future, depends on our frame of reference.
We can perhaps understand value along the lines of relative simultaneity. In
other work (Nebel 2015), I propose a reference-dependent notion of value, inspired
by Tversky and Kahneman (1991)’s notion of reference-dependent preferences.20
Instead of a single betterness relation over all outcomes, there are many betterness
relations, each indexed to some privileged reference point. These reference points
may be the status quo, some anticipated outcome, or some other standard (e.g.,
par in golf). Economists have used the idea of reference-dependent preferences
to explain a wide array of empirical phenomena; we might similarly hope that
the idea of reference-dependent betterness can explain some important normative
phenomena.
To get a feel for reference-dependent betterness, consider what Adams (1979)
says about our lives’ “retrospective preferability.” Adams supposes that if Helen
Keller had not been deafblind, then she would have led a happier life. That may
have given us reason to hope for her sake (before she became deafblind) that her
sight and hearing would be spared. But that life would have been extremely different
from her actual life. As Adams puts it,
That other, happier life would have contained few of the particular joys and
sorrows, trials and triumphs—in short very little of the concrete content—that
she cared about in her actual life. Her never having been blind or deaf would
have been very like her never having existed. (60)
So, given what Keller’s life was actually like, it is reasonable not to wish, for her
sake, that her sight and hearing had been spared.
We might understand this in terms of reference-dependent betterness.21 If Keller
hadn’t been deafblind, that would have been better for her only from certain frames
of reference—e.g., before she acquired the projects and values that guided her actual
life, or in a state of affairs where Keller isn’t deafblind.22 But, from the reference
point of the actual state of affairs, or of the world since she lost her sight and
hearing, it would have been worse (or, at least, not better) for her if she hadn’t been
deafblind.
The idea of reference-dependent betterness may seem to promise a way of recon-
ciling our intuitive judgments about the goodness and badness of the outcomes in
the spectrum arguments with the monotonicity of goodness and badness. The key
idea is that our reference point shifts as we move along the spectrum. Consider the
combined spectrum from (A) 3 × 225 years of mild pleasure and 1 year of agony
to (Z) 3 years of ecstasy and 225 years of mild pain. Suppose we claim only that Z
is better than A from reference points Z and A, that each outcome is worse than
its predecessor relative to its (and its predecessor’s) reference point, and that some
(but not all) of the outcomes are good (or bad) from some reference point or other.
We can then maintain that if x is good (relative to some reference point r ) and y is
better than x (relative to r ), then y must also be good (relative to r ). If our intuitive
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judgments about which outcomes are good or bad, and which are better and worse,
are made relative to different reference points as we move along the spectrum, then
these judgments need not conflict with the goodness and badness principles. That is
because these principles hold only given a fixed reference point: if x is good relative
to reference point r1, and y is better than x relative to some other reference point
r2, it need not be true that y is good relative to r1 or r2; for x might be bad relative
to r2, or better than y relative to r1.
We might object that, intuitively, our judgments about the outcomes along the
spectrum are reference-independent, in that they do not depend on which out-
come obtains or is the standard of reference. But, as with simultaneity and fu-
turity, proponents of reference-dependent betterness might hold that there is no
“absolute”—i.e., reference-independent—betterness relation or goodness property
to be instantiated.23
The notion of reference-dependent betterness may also be able to avoid
McTaggart’s problem. McTaggart’s problem was that unless certain lives or out-
comes are just plain bad, we cannot plausibly explain why their existence makes
the world worse, and is therefore undesirable. I mentioned that this claim could be
avoided if some lives counted as bad in every context. The cyclists cannot make
this move if betterness is reference-independent, because such lives seem better than
some elements of some combined spectrum. Their badness would then infect all the
elements of the betterness cycle, including ones that are intuitively not bad. But if
we can appeal to reference-dependent betterness, then we might claim that although
the life is bad from every reference point, no element of a combined spectrum is
such that, from every reference point, it is worse than this life. So no element of a
combined spectrum needs to count as bad from every reference point.
But there was another problem with the view that good is like tall, and reference-
dependent betterness seems not to avoid this problem. The problem was that, even
within a fixed context, some elements of the combined spectrum seem good and
others seem bad. Suppose, for example, that our reference point is not one of
the outcomes along the spectrum, but instead some neutral framing. We might
be deciding whether to bring someone into existence, and the outcomes along the
combined spectrum represent different possible lives that she might lead. Intuitively,
some of the lives (e.g., Z) are good relative to this neutral reference point, and others
(e.g., A) are bad relative to this same reference point. Which of the lives, if any, we
have most reason to choose depends on the betterness relation tied to our neutral
reference point. And each outcome still seems better than its successor, not just
relative to the reference point of each outcome and its successor, but from this
neutral point of view as well.24 Since Z also seems better than A from this reference
point, our neutral reference-dependent betterness relation seems to contain a cycle,
which (given monotonicity) would rule out A being bad and Z being good relative
to this neutral reference point.
My claim is not that there is a cycle here, but rather that the idea of reference-
dependent betterness does not explain away the appearance of a cycle from this
neutral reference point. So it does not capture our judgments about goodness and
badness in the combined spectrum, unless we are willing to reject the intuition that
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each outcome is better than its successor from our neutral reference point. But if we
are willing to reject this intuition about our neutral reference point’s betterness re-
lation, why shouldn’t we reject it when framed in reference-independent terms, as in
the initial spectrum arguments? The intuition seems to me no less compelling when
couched in terms of a neutral reference-dependent betterness relation than when
couched in terms of plain old betterness. But the purpose of reference-dependent
betterness in the present context was to make the radical conclusion of the com-
bined spectrum arguments—that nothing is good or bad—seem less implausible.
If, however, we are willing to reject a premise of these arguments, then we need not
try to make their radical conclusion seem less implausible. We can simply reject the
conclusion.
I, therefore, believe that the notion of reference-dependent betterness does not
preserve our intuitive judgments about the combined spectrum. Perhaps there is
some other way in which cyclists might claim that some of the outcomes along the
spectrum are good or bad in some sense that (a) is compatible with the goodness and
badness principles and (b) maintains some semblance of our intuitive judgments
about the outcomes. But I do not know what that way would be.
4. How (Not) to Reject the Spectrum Arguments
This leaves us with the conclusion that, on the cyclists’ view, nothing is good or
bad.25 That is absurd. We should, therefore, reject the spectrum arguments against
transitivity.
But how should we reject these arguments? Which of their assumptions should
we reject, and how can we dispel their apparent compellingness?26
I wish to conclude by considering two extant responses to the spectrum argu-
ments. In light of the modifications I introduced in section 1, one of these responses
now seems less promising, and the other more, than they might have otherwise
seemed.
4.1. Incommensurability
One response to the spectrum arguments appeals to incommensurability. Some
philosophers claim that some of the elements in each spectrum are incommensurate
in value with their predecessors, in the sense that they are neither better than,
nor worse than, nor exactly as good as their predecessors (Parfit 2012; Handfield
2014; Chang 2016). These experiences, therefore, do not give rise to a betterness
cycle.
The relevant kind of incommensurability would seem not to be incompara-
bility. For each element along the spectrum is quite similar to its predecessor,
whereas the most plausible examples of incomparability involve radically differ-
ent kinds of things—e.g., Shakespeare and
√
2—which do not bear the same kind
of value. The incommensurate elements might instead be held to be on a par
(Chang 2002).27
This response seems to me unpromising in the context of my combined spectrum.
For we can plausibly strengthen the goodness and badness principles as follows:
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The Strengthened Goodness Principle:
For any comparable value bearers x and y, if x is good and y is not, then x is
better than y.
The Strengthened Badness Principle:
For any comparable value bearers x and y, if x is bad and y is not, then x is
worse than y.
These principles entail the goodness and badness principles.28
The strengthened principles can be motivated by considering a thing’s value on
the assumption that it isn’t good. Of course, some things aren’t good because they
don’t bear any value whatsoever—e.g.,
√
2. But our concern is with things that bear
some relevant kind of value, and are comparable to things that are good or bad. If
some such thing isn’t good, then it is presumably either neutral or bad. Maybe it
can be indeterminate which of these it is. But, on either assumption, it is not only
not better than anything good (as the goodness principle claims), but also worse. It
is hard to see how something good could fail to be better than something neutral or
bad. This is true not only for the goodness of lives, outcomes, and experiences, but
also for “attributive” goodness—e.g., the goodness of artists. If one artist is good
and another is not, how could the one fail to be a better artist than the other?29
The strengthened principles, if true, make it futile to appeal to parity in the
combined spectrum. For if A is bad, and each element is either worse than or on
a par with its predecessor, then B must also be bad, according to the strengthened
badness principle. For if B were not bad, then it would be better than A. So B is
bad. Iterations of this reasoning yield that Z is bad. But Z seems good, not bad.
The appeal to parity, therefore, does not strike me as a promising response to the
spectrum arguments, in light of my combined variations.
4.2. Vagueness
A different response appeals to vagueness. Like most expressions in our language,
better than is vague. And many people claim that the spectrum arguments are
relevantly like sorites arguments, which exploit intuitions about vague predicates in
order to generate absurd conclusions.30 But the cyclists claim that the arguments
are disanalogous.31
It is not obvious how exactly the spectrum arguments are supposed to be soritical.
Consider, for example, the following sorites argument involving the predicate rich:
Someone with one dollar isn’t rich. For any n, if someone with n dollars isn’t
rich, then someone with n + 1 dollars isn’t rich. So a billionaire isn’t rich.
But obviously a billionaire is rich. We know this argument to be unsound. The
spectrum arguments, though, do not seem to have this simple structure, in which
some monadic predicate is claimed to be tolerant to a certain change in respects
relevant to its application.32
However, the cyclists’ judgments about the combined spectrum do give rise to
an argument with this structure. The cyclists claim that each element is worse than
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its predecessor, and so (by the badness principle) that each element is bad if its
predecessor is. This conditional gives rise to a sorites:
Z (3 years of ecstasy and 225 years of mild discomfort) is not bad. And, for any
n and m, if n years of pleasure and m years of pain are not bad, then neither
are 2n years of slightly less intense pleasure and m2 years of slightly more intense
pain. So A (3 × 225 years of mild pleasure and 1 year of agony) is not bad.
But, intuitively, A is bad. In this argument, the monadic predicate bad is claimed
to be tolerant to a certain change in respects relevant to its application. This leads
us to a counterintuitive conclusion.
Of course, there are differences between the two arguments. One difference that
might seem relevant lies in the motivation for the conditional premise. It seems
that if someone with n dollars isn’t rich, then someone with n + 1 dollars isn’t rich
either, despite the fact that the latter is richer than the former. But, in the combined
spectrum, it seems that if some element isn’t bad, then neither is its predecessor,
because each element seems worse than its predecessor. The conditional seems true
because, not in spite, of the comparative claim, which goes in the direction opposite
that of its analogue for rich.
But this difference is not relevant. There are many kinds of vague predicates and
many kinds of sorites arguments. Unlike rich and richer, which (we can suppose)
depend only on a person’s net worth, bad and worse are multidimensional. For exam-
ple, the badness of a painful experience depends on its duration as well as its inten-
sity. Whereas the sorites argument for rich appeals to the intuition that a marginal
difference in net worth cannot make a difference to whether or not one is rich, the
sorites argument for bad appeals to a different (but related) intuition about mul-
tidimensionally vague predicates. The intuition is that a marginal difference along
some dimensions (e.g., intensity of pleasure or pain) cannot make a difference to
whether or not an outcome is bad (or worse than some alternative), when there are
large differences along other relevant dimensions (e.g., duration of pleasure and
pain). It seems that such marginal differences should not be decisive, and that the
large differences should outweigh the small differences. That is why it seems that
every element should be worse than its predecessor, and therefore bad if its prede-
cessor is. This leads to a counterintuitive conclusion because the small differences
can add up to differences so great that we are inclined to think they are decisive.
This seems to be a very general feature of multidimensionally vague predicates,
as we saw with hairy in section 2.2.33 To take another example, health is a function
of several dimensions. I might be just barely healthy in each of these respects—e.g.,
because my blood pressure, pulse, blood sugar levels, and other relevant factors
are just slightly within the normal range—so that I am nonetheless healthy overall.
A small difference along one of these dimensions (say, blood sugar) seems like it
should not be decisive, with respect to whether or not I am healthy, when there is a
large difference along some other dimension. A slightly higher level of blood sugar
should not make me no longer healthy if it trades off with a significant improvement
with respect to some other factor—e.g., becoming perfectly healthy in one of the
other respects. But such tradeoffs add up. Even if I am perfectly healthy in every
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other respect I should no longer count as healthy if my blood sugar levels are far
outside the normal range.34 Like the combined spectrum argument, the problem
stems from a kind of tolerance which is characteristic of multidimensionally vague
expressions.
So how should we reject the seemingly soritical argument from the combined
spectrum? Perhaps by rejecting the conditional premise, which different solutions
to the sorites paradox do in different ways. On one view, there might be some
particular element that isn’t bad even though its predecessor is, although it is
unknowable which element that is (Williamson 1994). On other views, even if the
conditional premise is false, it need not be true of any particular element that it isn’t
bad even though its predecessor is (Fine 1975). On one view of this kind, each of the
conditional’s instances might even be true (Kamp 1981). These strategies would also
apply to the cyclists’ initial claim that each element is worse than its predecessor.
And, however we reject that claim in the context of the combined spectrum, we
could reject it in the same way in the context of the original spectrum arguments.
So, even though the original spectrum arguments seem to lack the form of a sorites
argument, they rest on a claim that seems to give rise to sorites arguments, which
we ought (somehow) to reject.
I do not insist that any solution to the sorites paradox will straightforwardly
explain what is wrong with the spectrum arguments. Nor do I insist that there are
no relevant differences between the spectrum arguments and the sorites paradox. I
remain open to the possibility that, for any duration of agony (or ecstasy), there is
some duration of mild discomfort (or mild pleasure) that would be worse (or better).
But I find that possibility hard to accept. So I hope that the reasoning which leads
to it can be rejected in some familiar way; my variations on the spectrum arguments
make me somewhat more confident that it can.
Here is what we have learned frommy variations on the spectrum arguments. The
cyclists must reject the monotonicity of good and bad or else deny that anything is
good or bad. Neither option is attractive. So we must reject the spectrum arguments
against transitivity. Perhaps we can reject them by solving the sorites paradox.
Notes
1 In what follows, I generally omit “all things considered” and speak only of “transitivity,” but this
should always be understood as the transitivity of the all-things-considered better than relation.
2 This would require some A, B, and C such that A is better than B, which is better than C, and yet
C is neither better nor worse than A. This could be because A and C are equally good. An anonymous
referee suggests that a cycle could then inevitably be constructed by making C very slightly better (call
it C+). But an ensuing cycle is guaranteed only on the assumption that if C+ is better than C, which is
just as good as A, then C+ must be better than A. This assumption is entailed by the transitivity of at
least as good as (Sen 1970, 10–11). But opponents of the transitivity of better than might well also reject
the transitivity of at least as good as. So they could, in principle, maintain that better than is acyclic.
A more interesting way of rejecting transitivity while maintaining acyclicity would be to hold that if
A is better than B, which is better than C, then C may not be worse than A, although it cannot be at
least as good as A—i.e., A and C may be incommensurate in value. This combination of claims may be
of interest for two reasons. First, it is compatible with the condition of Suzumura consistency (Suzumura
1976), which prohibits weak betterness cycles containing any instances of strict betterness: that is, for
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any set of x1, . . . , xn such that each xi is at least as good as xi+1 and xn is at least as good as x1, there is
no k and j such that xk is better than xj . This condition is stronger than acyclicity, neither implies nor is
implied by the transitivity of better than, and is both necessary and sufficient for the absence of money
pumps (Bossert and Suzumura 2010). Second, some might be inclined to make such judgments about
Parfit’s (1984) mere addition paradox. Many people are inclined to judge that some population (A) of
excellent lives is better than any population (Z) of mediocre lives; that any perfectly equal population
(such as Z) is better than any same-sized population (A+) of lives with lower average and (therefore)
total wellbeing; and that if A+ differs from A only via the addition of lives within some range, then A
and A+ are incommensurate.
3 One might take the lesson of the Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments to be that nothing is bad
simpliciter. I discuss this possibility in section 3. If you are tempted by it, you can read my claims about
badness here in the conditional spirit just stated, as what would be true if anything is bad. Note also
that even philosophers who find it unintelligible to talk of things as being just plain good or bad (e.g.,
Thomson 2001) might accept that the experiences under discussion are good or bad in some intelligible
and normatively relevant sense. Thomson, for example, accepts that things can be good or bad for you
(p. 13), which is surely true of the experiences in the spectrum arguments.
4 Temkin (2012, 519) attributes this worry to Derek Parfit. Temkin (2014, 471) notes the connection
between Parfit’s worry and the argument of this paper (cited there as Nebel 2012).
5 I do not suppose that this kind of balancing is precise, as if for every quantity of bad, there is
exactly one quantity of good such that combining those quantities is neutral. Perhaps there is a neutral
range with vague upper and lower bounds, although see Broome (2004) for objections to this idea; see
Rabinowicz (2009a; 2009b) for responses to Broome’s objections. If there is just a single neutral level of
value—i.e., a “zero” level—then my arguments below could take an even simpler form.
6 Of course, this heuristic raises difficult questions in the ethics of population. But it’s just a way to
get you to think about the balance between pleasure and pain in a third-personal way.
7 This is also observed by Carlson (2013). Danielsson (1996) makes a similar point in terms of
choiceworthiness.
8 Strictly speaking, one could reject (1) and (2) while maintaining their analogues in the original
spectrum arguments. But that position, I think, has no plausibility.
9 It may be hard to say that A is precisely neutral, because neutrality may be vague, as Broome
(2004) argues. But surely there is some version of A that is determinately not bad, although it may be
vague whether it is merely neutral or good.
10 There are issues, of course, having to do with the length of time in Z. It may therefore help to
imagine that these outcomes are experienced by creatures that don’t get bored.
11My quantifier here is restricted to things like outcomes, lives, experiences, states of affairs, or
whatever other kinds of things give rise to spectrum arguments.
12 See, e.g., Barker (2002), Burnett (2014), Fine (1975), Fara (2000), and Williamson (1994). Inter-
estingly, monotonicity has received little attention in the theory of value. See, however, Carlson (2011;
2013; 2016) and Danielsson (1996). Another exception may be Aristotle, whom Sahlin (1993, 185) quotes
as seeing “nothing to prevent even things which are not good from being preferable to things which are
good” (Topics, III.2 117a20–22).
13 See, e.g., Heim (2000) and especially Nouwen (2011). Note that the claim that I am 6 feet tall,
on this view, entails that I am also 5 feet tall. This may sound strange, because the sentence, “I am
5 feet tall,” seems to mean that I am exactly 5 feet tall. But this strangeness can be explained as a merely
pragmatic effect, in terms of scalar implicatures. In other contexts—e.g., “You must be 5 feet tall to ride
the Vominator”—the at least reading is clearly correct. (Thanks to Ben Holguin for the example.)
14 An anonymous referee suggests that, on the cyclists view, reasons might not have an absolute,
context-independent strength. On this kind of view, whether or not we have most reason to desire
some outcome might depend on the context, including the available alternatives. I would consider this
intriguing possibility to be a variant of a view I discuss in section 3, on which outcomes are only good
or bad, desirable or undesirable, relative to a context or frame of reference. I suspect that my objections
there would apply here, as well.
15What about doxastic analogues of these attitudes? An anonymous referee notes that if belief is just
credence above a certain threshold, and if the threshold for a given proposition depends on the stakes
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of acting on that proposition, then one can believe that p, be more certain of q, and yet not believe
q. This is an interesting possibility. I suspect that beliefs and credences are not relevantly analogous to
desires and preferences, respectively. Desiring is not preferring above a certain threshold, and whether
one desires a proposition does not depend on stakes in a way that is independent of what one prefers.
But I shall not try to defend these claims here.
16 This argument might seem to assume that if it’s necessary that (if you ψ , then you φ), then
we can infer that you ought to φ from the fact that you ought to ψ . And this inference sometimes
seems bad (Broome 2013, 121). It seems bad when one doesn’t ψ and yet φing has some disadvantage
in worlds where one fails to ψ . But such cases for desiring and preferring would seem to involve the
“wrong kind of reason” problem (see Rabinowicz and RPnnow-Rasmussen 2004), and the proponent of
a fitting-attitudes analysis already needs a solution to that problem. So I don’t think we should expect
the inference to be bad in this instance.
17 This is a paraphrase of Temkin (2012, 371).
18My interpretation of McTaggart’s objection is indebted to Broad (1938).
19 Some may also claim that living such a life would be worse for the person who lives it than
nonexistence (Roberts 2011; Arrhenius and Rabinowicz 2015; Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 2015). Others
would find this claim incoherent (Broome 2004). I need not take a stance on it here.
20 In Nebel (2015), I propose reference-dependent value as a way of making sense of rational status
quo bias as well as deliberation under an essentially comparative view of the good. Ideas similar to
reference-dependent betterness have been suggested by Brennan and Hamlin (2016, “state-dependent
value”), Frick (2014,“context-dependent betterness”), and Dreier (2016,“world-centered value”).
21 Adams doesn’t understand it this way. He supposes that Keller’s life, had she not been deafblind,
would have been better, but that her actual life is nonethess preferable in retrospect, because the better
life bears no self-interest relation to her actual life. But if we wish to maintain a strong connection
between betterness and what we have reason to prefer, then the idea of reference-dependent betterness
seems to me essential.
22When we state an evaluation and tie it to some reference point, this may make it sound as if the
evaluation is subjective—i.e., as if one outcome is better than another from some reference point just in
case one who occupies that reference point would judge the one better than the other. But I intend the
reference-dependent evaluation to be thoroughly objective and independent of our attitudes.
23 Some might object that if betterness is reference-dependent, then it isn’t all-things-considered. But
all-things-considered betterness is betterness overall, as opposed to in some respect or along a certain
dimension. Reference-dependent betterness relations may take into account betterness relations over
multiple dimensions of value.
24 Some proponents of reference-dependent betterness might claim that we are psychologically
incapable of holding the reference point fixed—i.e., that we cannot help but shift the reference point when
attending to different pairs along the spectrum. But this would seem to me a strange and unmotivated
fact about our psychology, and without further evidence that it is true, I am inclined to believe that we
are perfectly capable of considering the various outcomes from the same neutral frame of reference.
25 Again, my quantifier here is restricted to the kinds of things that can be better or worse than the
things that show up in the spectrum arguments.
26 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to explore this question here.
27 For an account of parity and other varieties of incommensurability in terms of fitting attitudes,
see Rabinowicz (2008; 2012).
28 Suppose, for reductio, that the strengthened goodness principle is true but that the non-
strengthened version is false. Then there is some x and y such that (i) x is good, (ii) y is better
than x, but (iii) y isn’t good. x and y are comparable, given (ii). So (i) and (iii) entail that x is better than
y, by the strengthened goodness principle. But that contradicts (ii), by the asymmetry of better than.
29 Note that if one person wasn’t an artist at all, then it would be easy to see how she wouldn’t
be a worse artist. But that would be a case of incomparability, due to noninstantiation of the relevant
property.
30 See Qizilbash (2005) and Wasserman (2005). Similar claims about similar arguments have been
made by Ackerman (1994), Danielsson (1996), Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005), and Voorhoeve and
Binmore (2006).
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31 For the most comprehensive list of disanalogies, see Temkin (2012, sec. 9.2).
32 For the notion of tolerance, see Wright (1975).
33 Grinsell (2013) argues that this feature is relevantly like continuity assumptions in the theory of
social choice. He argues that the sorites paradox is just an instance of Chichilnisky (1982)’s impossibility
theorem.
34 See Sassoon (2013) for a theory of multidimensional gradability which can explain this judgment.
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